Google書籍検索で古い具体例を探してみると、おそらく最古のものが1982年の Armed Forces Journal International 誌のこちら。
The opening quote of his Marine friend— “ Amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics " —puts it all neatly in perspective. Logistics, like tactics, may not be as intellectually “respectable” as the presumably higher realms of strategic theory, but logistics and tactics win wars.
there is an old cliche, which I know you have heard before, which says that in military events, the amateurs like to talk about strategy and the professionals like to talk about logistics.
There is an old joke that amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics. This is unfair, but efficient logistics for modern forces require the sorts of systems analysis “bookkeeping” at which critics sneer.
There is an old saying that amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics. If the saying is true, then the American military has a tradition of professionalism.
There is much dispute as to who uttered this military maxim. It has been attributed to General Omar Bradley and US Marine Corps Commandant General Robert H. Barrow. In various other forms, it has also been attributed to Napoleon, Helmuth von Moltke, and Carl von Clausewitz.
“Amateurs talk about strategy and tactics. Professionals talk about logistics and sustainability in warfare” was said by Robert Hilliard Barrow (1922-2008), a United States Marine Corps four-star general, in an interview published in the San Diego (CA) Union on November 11, 1979.
「アマチュアは戦略や戦術を語る。プロは戦場での兵站と持続可能性について語る」これは、米国海兵隊大将であったロバート・H・バロウ（1922-2008）が、1979年11月11日に San Diego Union 紙（カリフォルニア州）に掲載されたインタビューの中で述べたものである。
ではこの記事を確認してみたい。この The San Diego Union 紙はその後 San Diego Evening Tribune 紙と合併して現在は The San Diego Union-Tribune 紙となっている。そしてその過去記事は、米国の新聞データベース会社NewsBankが運用している以下のサイトで探して購入できる。
11 November 1979, San Diego Union, “Q&A: Marines’ Barrow Backs SALT—And Conventional Rearming”
Q: But If I hear correctly, Army is proposing 110,000-member strike force that can be airlifted around the globe to protect energy and so forth. What does that do to your thesis?
A: We hear the words “rapid deployment force,“ and I'm not here to be critical of the term or those who believe in it. But maybe we don't need two, one army and one Marine. This is what the Marines have been doing for years. And, when you talk about airlift, while it responds beautifully to that American interest in wanting to go some place quickly, it's kind of poor way to get the totality of combat power so often called for within a limited time frame. You don't go, ho hum, landing in some airfield, with everybody getting out like Pan Am. It's dependent on base rights and overflight rights which can be — and have been — easily denied by any second rate country. While airlift is a good way to get something critically needed someplace in a hurry, I just don't see how you can compare that to seapower, to amphibious force carrying in the supplies to support themselves once they arrive. And there's no way you can bring in100,000 troops by air. When you get to 12,000 or 15,000, whoever's in charge is going to say, “Quit sending me more consumers — I need more consumables.“ Amateurs talk about strategy and tactics. Professionals talk about logistics and sustainability in warfare. One ship could put ashore all that you could carry in 15 or 20 days of the maximum airlift capacity we have.
Omar Bradley (1893-1981), the last five-star officer of the United States, is often credited, but it’s uncertain if he ever said it. “For military command is as much a practice of human relations as it is a science of tactics and a knowledge of logistics”—a somewhat related quotation—was printed in Bradley’s book, A Soldier’s Story (1951). “I was reminded of what General Omar Bradley once said: ‘Amateurs talk about strategy; professionals talk about logistics’” was a letter printed in The Economist (London, UK) on November 16, 1996. General Bradley’s statements were usually recorded, and it’s unlikely that he said it and that it would not be cited in print before 1996.
The evaluation of logistic effectiveness is one that requires the finest kind of mature and fully informed professional judgment. It is not an area where amateurs and the use of superficial statistics can contribute to our national security. This careful evaluation is particularly important in connection with those organizations and procedures which were established in response to the clear lessons of previous war experience.
